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1 Alfred Marshall’s definition of economics was the “study of mankind in the ordinary business 
of life” (Marshall 1969: 1), quoted in E. T. Penrose (2009: 234). 
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When Edith T. Penrose became Fritz Machlup’s student in the late-1940s, she found little in 
mainstream or Austrian economics to guide her as she began her explorations into the growth of 
the firm. While she acknowledged Kenneth Boulding’s influence on her work, we suspect she 
drew on a broader tradition that includes, among others, Alfred Marshall, Frank Knight 
(Boulding’s teacher), and Ronald Coase. We seek to demonstrate Penrose’s connection to this 
‘invisible college’, particularly to Knight, and its influence on her investigation of the growth of 
the firm. Given mainstream economists’ pursuit of rigor at the expense of practical relevance and 
their continuing inattention to Coase’s work, we suggest Penrose’s work on the growth of the 
firm can be understood as part of a broader tradition represented by this ‘invisible college’, 









EDITH T. PENROSE: ECONOMIST OF ‘THE ORDINARY BUSINESS OF LIFE’ 
 
“If all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting and music would 
not exist.” (Dewey, 2005: 77) 
 
In this paper, we explore Edith T. Penrose’s (ETP) intellectual sources, particularly the 
unremarked upon links between ETP’s work and the ideas of Frank H. Knight (FHK). We 
believe ETP’s oeuvre is better understood and appreciated if it is considered as part of an 
‘invisible college’ that includes others such as Alfred Marshall, FHK, and Ronald Coase. This 
claim may seem odd given that ETP was Fritz Machlup’s student. However, rather than having a 
direct theoretical influence on ETP’s writing, Machlup’s mentorship can be seen most strongly in 
the clarity and structure of her work and her attention to detail, particularly in The Theory of the 
Growth of the Firm (TTGF).  Machlup gave her a methodological framework for structuring her 
research and findings (Connell, 2007, 2009). 
While the scholars comprising our ‘invisible college’ differed in many respects, they 
shared a commitment to explore the limits of rigorous theorizing in sociology and economics. 
However, they were not trending towards today’s positivist rigor, even as many see FHK as its 
architect, the shaper of the Chicago School (along with Jacob Viner) and George Stigler’s and 
Milton Friedman’s teacher (Backhouse, 2004: 203; Emmett, 2009; Van Horn, Mirowski, & 
Stapleford, 2011). ETP was also well-aware of the limits to formal theorizing about the ‘ordinary 
business of life’ and its economics (e.g., E. T. Penrose, 1958), a view that she shared with Coase 
and FHK (e.g. Coase, 1964; Knight, 1924). Thus, our claim is that ETP was a member of an 
‘invisible college’ that was interested in advancing an ethically infused, politically conscious 
economics that could better serve society’s needs and that she was not the isolated scholar with a 
de novo approach that some suggest. 
Connecting ETP to this ‘invisible college’, particularly with FHK, is complicated. ETP 
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made no known comments about FHK’s ideas. Citations were sparse; FHK’s Risk, Uncertainty, 
and Profit (RUP) was cited only twice and without comment in the footnotes of TTGF (E. T. 
Penrose, 2009: 50n57, 69n77). There was nothing further on FHK in ETP’s oeuvre, nor was 
FHK’s work discussed by commentators on ETP’s work (e.g. Foss, 1999; Lazonick, 2002; 
Loasby, 1999, 2012). Direct citations with comment on Boulding, FHK’s student, are slightly 
more forthcoming (see E. T. Penrose, 2009: 5n6, 10n9, 24n25, 29n34, 135n158), but the record 
is incomplete at best. There is no evidence of ETP’s broader engagement with FHK’s work. 
Thus, our task is to tease out linguistic similarities in search of tantalizing clues that demonstrate 
the influence of this ‘invisible college’ on ETP’s work. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we highlight some important 
events in ETP’s life prior to beginning her doctoral studies under Machlup at Johns Hopkins 
University (JHU), providing historical context for our discussion of ETP’s immersion into the 
available literature on the ‘theory of the firm’ (ToF). Then we discuss ETP’s work leading up to 
TTGF, delving into the evolution of her own ToF, followed by an examination of her novel 
language and its implications. We then discuss ETP’s membership in an ‘invisible college’ that 
includes Marshall, FHK, and Coase. Finally, we examine perhaps the profoundest axiom of 
ETP’s language, her separation of ‘services’ from ‘resources’, and explore how this relates to 
FHK’s earlier ideas. 
ETP’s Formative Years 
Many reading TTGF today, especially if they presume it was ETP’s PhD thesis under 
Machlup at JHU, may also presume she knew little about economics before she began her studies 
with him in 1947. They would be wrong on both counts. What follows is a brief account of 
ETP’s life up until she arrived at JHU. Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section is 
4 
 
from ETP’s biography written by her daughter-in-law Angela (see A. Penrose, 2018). 
From 1932 through 1936, ETP was an undergraduate student at UC Berkeley, majoring 
in economics. Against college rules, she “secretly” married David Denhardt, a law student, in 
1933. As an undergraduate, ETP was active in student government and the university’s debating 
societies. She was also involved with several activist groups on campus concerned about labor 
rights. Along with Denhardt’s brother, she and other like-minded students assembled the Sentries 
of American Youth. ETP played a prominent role in the open forum that the group organized to 
discuss the issues surrounding the general strike by San Francisco Bay workers in 1934. 
In her final year at Berkeley, she began to attend the lectures of Ernest Francis Penrose 
(Pen), a leading agricultural geographer and economist (E. F. Penrose, 1934). In the summer of 
1936, ETP became Pen’s assistant, typing letters, organizing courses, and especially helping with 
research. After graduation, ETP remained in Berkeley to continue her work with Pen, while her 
husband headed to Colusa, California to begin working as an assistant district attorney. Of note, 
ETP worked closely with Pen on two demanding projects, the California Medical-Economic 
Survey and a study on Japanese economic development that was being edited by Elizabeth 
Boody Schumpeter, the wife of Joseph Schumpeter. 
In early-1937, ETP finally left Berkeley to join her husband in Colusa, but she remained 
in contact with Pen. Pen’s letters to ETP detailed his struggles with the California Medical 
Association and its unwillingness to publish the findings of the Medical-Economic Survey, while 
ETP’s letters to Pen shared her struggles adjusting to life away from the university. In early-
1938, ETP and her husband moved to the small town of Williams, California. Soon after, 
Denhardt announced his intentions to run for district attorney. On August 1, 1938, he was killed 
while hunting with colleagues from the district attorney’s office. 
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After this tragedy, Pen offered ETP an opportunity to work for him at the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) in Geneva. Leaving her new-born son David in California with her 
parents, ETP departed for the ILO where she became involved in international economic policy 
at the highest-level during World War 2. Of note, ETP led the study of and authored a report on 
food policy in the United Kingdom while she and Pen were stationed in London during the War 
(see Denhardt, 1943). By May 1946, she had married Pen and returned to the U.S. with their two 
new children, Perran and Trevan. In New York, ETP worked closely with Eleanor Roosevelt on 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1947, Pen became Professor of Geography and 
International Relations at JHU. Perhaps the prospect of being a faculty wife provoked ETP to 
begin her own academic career with an MA; but she was no novice. To the contrary, from her 
work with Pen at Berkeley and the ILO, and with Eleanor Roosevelt, ETP was a widely 
experienced, self-directed economic researcher who had come into contact with many of the 
world’s leading economists, including Friedrich Hayek, Lionel Robbins, Austin and Joan 
Robinson, John Jewkes, John Maynard Keynes, and Joseph Schumpeter. 
Given ETP’s legendary discipline, work ethic, activist background, and international 
experience, it was surprising she had no specific ‘research question’ in mind. Lacking this, she 
joined the newly arrived Machlup on his project on the economic impact of patents (Machlup, 
1958, 1962). Her 1948 MA thesis was titled Discussion of Patents in Economic Doctrine. 
Machlup was impressed and collaborated with ETP on “The Patent Controversy in the 19th 
Century” (Machlup & E. T. Penrose, 1950). ETP extended this into her dissertation, published as 
The Economics of the International Patent System (E. T. Penrose, 1951), which attracted positive 




ETP was appointed as a Research Associate in 1950 and Lecturer in 1951 in Political 
Economy at JHU, teaching the social control of industry, monetary economics, and international 
economics. Machlup mentioned ETP in a footnote in his paper to the 1951 Round Table 
Conference on Monopoly, Competition, and their Regulation, attended by FHK and the 
Robinsons, acknowledging ETP’s ‘valuable contributions’ (Machlup, 1954: 387n4). However, 
with a further new son Trevear and poor salary, it is unlikely she attended the conference. 
Lacking any specific interest in firms but needing to earn some money, ETP subsequently joined 
a study of the growth of business firms funded by the Merrill Foundation for the Advancement of 
Financial Knowledge. It was co-managed by G. H. Evans, Jr., chairman of the Economics 
Department, and Machlup. 
The ToF Literature in the Early 1950s 
After joining the project, ETP settled into nine months of reading and thinking, 
concluding that the traditional ToF was not very relevant to theorizing the growth of the firm 
(Parkin & King, 1992; P. Penrose & Pitelis, 1999: 5). In the Foreword to the 3rd edition of 
TTGF, she recalled that “a definition of a firm with ‘insides’ was required – a definition more 
akin to that used by economists working on the structure of industry, such as Alfred Marshall or 
E. A. G. Robinson, and by those from other disciplines treating the firm as an organization” (E. 
T. Penrose, 2009: 235).  
What was the ToF literature that ETP read and dismissed as she began her research? 
Machlup’s Presidential address to the American Economic Association in 1966 provides some 
insight into what she might have read and discussed with him (Machlup, 1967). His address 
recalled the disciplinary conflicts of the 1940s about whether marginalist ToFs should be 
displaced or merely supplemented by the newer, ‘more realistic’ managerial and behavioral 
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theories that had emerged since the 1920s. He likened the conflict to another Methodenstreit 
(Machlup, 1967: 3). He concluded economics had fragmented into a plurality of incompatible 
theories, each with some merit. He sketched ten and commended researchers to use the one best 
suited to their purpose.2 
The variety of theories available was also obvious to ETP. She noted “[t]he firm is by no 
means an unambiguous clear-cut entity” (E. T. Penrose, 2009: 9). Like Machlup, she was aware 
each analysis reflected its author’s purpose. Most mainstream economists thought of the firm as 
ETP defined it: “an administrative organization and a collection of productive resources; its 
general purpose is to organize … the production and sale of goods and services at a profit” (E. T. 
Penrose, 2009: 28). Unlike her mainstream colleagues, she saw this definition as the beginning 
of an enquiry into firms and managing them, not an end. Every term used – administrative, 
organization, sale, goods, and, especially, resources – begged questions. Absent physical 
definitions (i.e., an underpinning ontology), all were assumptions woven into a net of language 
deployed to catch analysts’ ideas about firms. Better assumptions would open their enquiry to 
new insights; bad assumptions would shut it down, promoting tautology, poor thinking, and poor 
policy. 
One ToF story is of ‘Smithian’ enterprises and goes back centuries, presuming owner-
managers set up firms and coordinate the ‘division of labor’ directly, by ‘fiat’ rather than by 
‘truck, barter, and exchange’ (Best, 2012). ETP accepted the division of labor as basic. She 
presumed it was coordinated by ‘authoritative communication’, a term she borrowed from 
Chester Barnard (Barnard, 1938; E. T. Penrose, 2009: 17n17). Organization theorists took up this 
model, typically through the prism of Max Weber’s bureaucratic theory. Its history was of 
 
2 Curiously, he did not cite TTGF or mention ETP in his address. This curious omission was 
noted in Lazonick (2020). 
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increasing elaboration and sophistication. In this view, firms are also seen as ‘organizations’, 
along with other non-economic groups such as churches, hospitals, and football leagues. ETP 
also drew on the Carnegie School’s ideas about managerial knowledge and behavior (E. T. 
Penrose, 2009: 15n15, 28n33). 
Another story saw ‘the firm’ as a domain of the socially, ethically, and politically 
legitimated managerial power that emerged from the European guilds (Greif, 2006; Ogilvie, 
2011). In this view, the firm was regarded as a community of power specific to its participants. 
Managers’ power within their firm did not imply any power beyond the firm, in other 
communities. In this story the firm was an idiosyncratic ‘private’ zone separated from the polity 
and socio-economy beyond, where other more public systems of power, markets, and social 
arrangements pertained. D. H. Robertson’s metaphor, quoted by Coase, of firms as ‘islands of 
conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a 
pail of buttermilk’ reflected this perspective (Coase, 1937: 388). 
ETP would have also likely been familiar with the history of the ToF recounted later by 
Harold Demsetz (Demsetz, 1988). In this story, from the time of Adam Smith until the 19th 
century, economists’ principal focus was on ‘price theory’ and how markets function. According 
to economists working in this tradition, well-functioning markets maximized society’s economic 
benefits. But this undercut considering firms as alternative ‘problem solving institutions’ (i.e., 
alternative to markets). The mainstream analysis was of causes (prices) and consequences 
(trades). Firms had no significant features beyond their price-making or price-taking.  
Demsetz argued FHK and Coase broke the orthodox view of firms apart by re-imagining 
them as alternative modes of social organization. FHK and Coase’s chisel was ‘uncertainty’, 
ushering in a new generation of economists who saw firms as uncertainty-bearing institutions. 
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Entrepreneurial judgment was the key resource able to ‘bear uncertainty’, ill-conceived as a 
price-able factor of production. Demsetz’s telling reflected his own theoretical agenda, for he 
argued that there was no great difference between arrangements within firms and within markets, 
trashing the distinction as ‘delusion’ (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972: 777). Thereby, while Alchian 
and Demsetz theorized about ‘teamwork’, their arguments reinforced the mainstream 
economists’ view that firms were creatures of market-defined characteristics only; that other 
aspects were irrelevant. 
Nicolai Foss’s work provides a good window into the ToF literature ETP likely 
encountered (e.g., Foss, 1991, 1994, 1998; Foss & Klein, 2006; Foss, Lando, & Thomsen, 2000). 
Rather than beginning with Adam Smith and a free-market focus, Foss took off from Thorstein 
Veblen’s critique of mathematical economics (Foss, 1991: 64; Veblen, 1898). Veblen was a 
student of John Bates Clark, who developed a brutally competitive Darwinian view of economic 
activity. Veblen explored the limits of Clark’s view, especially given the socially beneficial 
effects of well-built institutions. Veblen became a ‘Father of American Institutionalism’ and 
called for an evolutionary approach. His critique aligned with Alfred Marshall’s, bearing in mind 
that the ‘folklore view’ of Marshall as the ‘Father of Marginalism’ was ‘grossly inaccurate’ 
(Foss, 1994: 1116; Raffaelli, 2003). 
Foss’s story goes on to note that technical problems with naïve ‘economies of scale’ led 
inter-war micro-economists to re-think firms as instances of imperfect competition, leading to 
the ToFs of Edward Chamberlin, Joan Robinson, and Robert Triffin. Foss (1994) deemed that 
these unproductive diversions ensured that economists failed to embrace evolutionary ideas. 
However, politics also came into play. There were urgent debates about firms as legitimated 
instances of entrepreneurs’ evident freedoms to create monopolies, tilting the balance between 
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government controls, the citizenry, and free competition. For example, Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means drew attention to the separation of corporate ownership and control and how it put 
managements’ freedoms at the center of a discussion about business’s political power (Berle Jr & 
Means, 1932). As the economy evolved, firms seemed to acquire two differing modes of 
existence, (i) as politically powerful actors and (ii) as zones of non-democratically bounded 
managerial power. The second was bleeding into the first, leading to managers exercising 
political powers for which they were not held accountable. 
Another way to appreciate Foss’s analysis is to track what happened to Marshall’s 
‘representative firm’ as it was criticized by Robbins (1928) and finally displaced by Arthur 
Pigou’s ‘equilibrium firm’ (Pigou, 1928: 239). Marshall’s famous metaphor was of firms as 
heterogeneous trees that comprised a forest, their industry (Foss, 1994: 1118; Marshall, 1969: 
263). His metaphor was carefully chosen to relate a number of evolving firms, each with its own 
character and lifecycle, some prospering, some not, to their stable industry (Raffaelli, 2003: 109). 
Whereas Marshall saw every real firm as unique and different, his representative firm was an 
‘ideal type’ for analytic purposes. The representative firm was “one which has a fairly long life, 
and fair success, which is managed with normal ability, and which has normal access to the 
economies, external and internal, which belong to that aggregate volume of production” 
(Marshall, 1964: 180; 1969: 265). 
Marshall’s representative firm was an intermediate analytic entity interposed between (a) 
the heterogeneous real firms that he had observed during his frequent ‘industrial wanderings’ 
(Whitaker, 1975), and (b) the equilibrium of a real industry. The representative firm was pivotal 
to his attempt to synthesize his intuitions into a formal system of economics. Thus “it explains 
why Marshall’s concept of industry equilibrium has no room for an equilibrium firm” (Foss, 
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1994: 1119). Pigou’s ‘equilibrium firm’ eviscerated Marshall’s idiographic firms, replacing them 
with a generalized marginalist ‘black box’, without internal characteristics, defined solely by 
market prices. This eviscerated model was likely what ETP encountered as she read into the ToF 
literature. It was nomothetic and devoid of idiographic particularity. Coase would later dub it 
‘blackboard economics’ (Coase, 1964; Medema, 1995). All discussion of a firm’s unique nature 
was silenced.  
Developing Her Own Language 
As noted in the previous section, ETP’s reading led her to conclude the traditional ToF 
did not illuminate the growth of firms (Parkin & King, 1992; P. Penrose & Pitelis, 1999). 
Somewhat to her own astonishment, after years of analyzing and reporting others’ empirical data 
and thinking, she began to develop her own ToF, one fashioned to her investigation into their 
growth. As Buckley and Casson (2007) summarized, in the end, ETP dismissed the idea that the 
size of a firm could be explained via the interplay of its economies and diseconomies of scale, 
arguing instead that it hinged on interacting ‘economies of growth’. In this section, we delve into 
the evolution of the language she developed over the course of the 1950s to capture this intuition, 
especially the agency inherent in managers’ drive, imagination, learning, and teamwork, 
culminating in the publication of TTGF in 1959. 
The first fruits of ETP’s efforts appeared in a squabble over biological models with 
Armen Alchian (Alchian, 1950, 1953; E. T. Penrose, 1952, 1953). She faulted Alchian for 
excising human agency, though without offering a competing theory of her own and following, 
without citation, Allyn Young’s argument (Young, 1925: 157). Her analysis took off from the 
lifecycle analogies found in Alfred Marshall’s evolutionary writings and from Kenneth 
Boulding’s fondness for biological models (E. T. Penrose, 1952: 805 [nn 2,3]; 2009: 234). 
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Ironically, ETP saw how the lifecycle ToF might appeal to microeconomists because it gave 
every firm a unique non-market-defined character – its age. She concluded, however, that it 
came at too high a price, erasing the managers’ entrepreneurial agency: “The development of 
firms does not proceed according to the same ‘grim’ laws as does that of living organisms.” (E. 
T. Penrose, 1952: 806). Rather, she suggested that a firm’s growth could only be understood as 
the consequence of its managers’ decisions, bringing their agency front-and-center. “We know of 
no general laws pertaining to men’s choices, nor have we as yet any established basis for the 
existence of such laws.” (E. T. Penrose, 1952: 808). On the same grounds she dismissed two 
variants of biological theory, viability and homeostasis. 
ETP’s focus on managerial agency meant dismissing the mainstream’s market- and 
equilibrium-based notions. Consequently, the firm’s growth might then be driven endogenously 
by the managers’ imagination and learning, as well as by taking advantage of market 
imperfections and the firm’s market power. Inter alia, ETP’s interest in evolution led her to 
focus on ‘process’ versus ‘structure’, a distinction explored in today’s agency-structure debates 
(e.g. Archer, 2003). ETP’s 1952 paper began to deploy her new ToF language; key was the claim 
that a firm’s growth was driven by its managers, and limited only by their skills and capacities 
(E. T. Penrose, 1952: 808). 
“Limits to the Growth and Size of Firms” (LGSF) followed and used most of the 
language deployed and further elaborated in TTGF (E. T. Penrose, 1955). Central was her novel 
‘theoretical’ distinction between ‘economies of size’ and ‘economies of growth’, rejecting 
marginalist analyses based on economies or diseconomies of scale. This distinction also played 
into her view that, being based on an inappropriate economics, antitrust policy was flawed. 
Lacking a relevant economics, policy-makers fixated on the political downsides of monopoly 
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power and denied themselves insight into the possible benefits of bigness, especially when it 
came to the research that led to innovation and patents (E. T. Penrose, 2009: 229). Her anti-
antitrust policy views were echoed, though from a different political viewpoint, by Oliver 
Williamson, after his time with the Antitrust Division in 1966 (Williamson, 1986: xv). 
Williamson’s analysis had an impact on U.S. policymakers that Penrose’s did not. 
Working on LGSF helped ETP sharpen her research question, which she re-expressed in 
the Foreword to the 3rd Edition of TTGF as “whether there was something inherent in the very 
nature of a firm that both promoted its growth and necessarily limited its rate of growth” (E. T. 
Penrose, 2009: 235). Her conclusion; growth was not driven by superior resources or 
comparative advantage. Rather, it was driven by managers’ interests and skills. ETP’s contrast of 
economies of scale and of growth was radical. It implied there was no optimum firm size, nor 
ultimate limit to a firm’s growth; a shocking conclusion with political implications (E. T. 
Penrose 2009: 240). The marginalist, ‘black-box’ ToF proved inadequate to analyzing firm 
growth. Rather than save marginalist language, ETP strove to theorize disequilibrium and 
learning. Portending a theory of entrepreneurship, managing growth was not the same as 
managing steady state or competitive equilibrium. Likewise, growth by acquisition and by 
innovation were different, raising new questions about monopoly that ETP sketched in the final 
chapters of TTGF (Blundel, 2015). 
ETP’s new language was evident in LGSF but it was further developed as she worked 
diligently to finalize the manuscript for TTGF over the subsequent years. The context within 
which ETP worked during this period was key to the evolution of her language. First, in 1954, 
funded by the Foundation for Economic Education, ETP spent six weeks on-site in discussion 
with the managers of the Hercules Powder Company. Hercules had been spun off from Du Pont 
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in a 1912 Antitrust decision. By the mid-1950s, it had become a conglomerate, engaged in 
radical innovation, diversification, and acquisition. ETP intended to publish her casework on 
Hercules as part of TTGF but it was excised by the editors against her wishes and only published 
later (E. T. Penrose, 1960). 
Then, in May 1955, ETP and family moved from JHU to Australia on a ‘leave of 
absence’. While in Melbourne, ETP spent “a most interesting 3 days talking to the really big 
shots of Australian firms” (A. Penrose, 2018: 144), including executives from General Motors-
Holden, the wholly owned subsidiary of General Motors. The seminars that she conducted while 
in Australia greatly encouraged her. As she noted in a letter to Machlup her “line of reasoning 
about things stood up beyond my expectations” (A. Penrose, 2018: 144). 
ETP and family then returned to the US in late-1955. She was elected to JHU’s General 
Assembly in October 1956, securing her lectureship. However, unhappy with the political 
situation in the US, Pen and ETP decided to go to Baghdad to help establish a new academic 
institution. In September 1957, ETP arrived in Baghdad, the TTGF manuscript still incomplete 
(A. Penrose, 2018: 153). Remarkably, given her heavy teaching and administrative loads her 
thinking was enriched by new analyses of the oil industry, visiting the Kirkuk oil fields, and her 
discussions with oil industry executives and national administrators, especially about the 
industry’s political role and constraints (A. Penrose, 2018: 156,157). 
Reminiscent of Marshall’s ‘industrial wanderings’, ETP’s interaction with the managers 
from the Hercules Powder Company, General Motors-Holden, and the multinational oil 
companies in Iraq provided her with an opportunity to observe real firms at work, rather than 
simply theorizing about them from her office. By analyzing managerial interests, capabilities, 
and the language the managers used, she was able to examine and refine the language she had 
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been developing for describing growing firms. Rather than trying to develop a nomothetic ToF, 
ETP chose instead to treat firms as idiographic and to capture their uniqueness. Perhaps her 
interactions with executives also inspired her to read Chester Barnard’s 1938 book, which had 
not been cited in LGSF. 
In TTGF, ETP’s economics would stand on the specific firm’s managers’ knowledge and 
entrepreneurial agency, most famously on their capability to transform its resources into services. 
Rather than using historians’ time, the firm’s entrepreneurial or strategic time would be 
measured by the managers’ ‘learning’. Few economists, Smith and Marshall being obvious 
exceptions, had the intellectual heft and disciplinary courage to attempt such an argument, in part 
because they could then not avoid addressing the ethical and policy implications of the specific 
managers’ choices (E. T. Penrose, 1952: 809). ETP’s ‘economizing’ entailed ethical choices. 
Understanding ETP’s New Language 
In this section, we examine the language ETP developed in LGSF and expanded in 
TTGF. Our examination begins with a discussion of a series of papers by Yasemin Kor, Joseph 
Mahoney, and their colleagues, in which they successfully unpack TTGF’s vocabulary (Kor & 
Mahoney, 2000; Kor & Mahoney, 2004; Kor, Mahoney, & Michael, 2007; Kor, Mahoney, 
Siemsen, & Tan, 2016). We then present our own interpretation of TTGF’s vocabulary, 
culminating in 15 axioms that capture the essence of the new language ETP developed for 
describing the firm. 
In a 2016 paper, Kor and colleagues discuss ETP’s intellectual sources which are similar 
but not identical to the influences we note, including P. Sargent Florence (as a connection to 
Marshall) and Walter Heller (see Heller, 1951). Using a ‘subjective’ and ‘interpretive’, rather 
than ‘positivist’, methodology, they identify 14 distinct ideas underpinning ETP’s language, 
16 
 
highlighting the words, terms, and meanings that underpin her discourse. Social studies have 
seen a recent ‘turn to rhetoric’, something of a rebalancing away from rigorous positivist 
methods (Barglela-Chiappini, 2009; Cooren, Kuhn, Cornelissen, & Clark, 2011; Hardy, 
Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; Simons, 1990). This turn is not so much novel as a recovery of an 
earlier ethnomethodological tradition that formed a part of the pluralistic approach to economics 
J. N. Keynes expounded in The Scope and Method of Political Economy. 
At Marshall’s behest, J. N. Keynes (1890) argued a ‘useful’ economics required three 
complementary languages: (a) rigorous theorizing, (b) knowledge of the context’s political 
economy and history, and (c) attention to the arts of economic practice - in short, mathematics, 
history, and art, the latter two of which lie beyond the grasp of positivist science. ETP’s analysis 
of her research question, “whether there was something inherent in the very nature of a firm that 
both promoted its growth and necessarily limited its rate of growth” (E. T. Penrose, 2009: 235) 
shows J. N. Keynes’ three languages. For example, ETP uncovered a general tendency, dubbed 
the ‘Penrose Effect’, that indicates that the rate of firm growth is restricted by the rate of 
managerial learning. However, she also recognized the rate of managerial learning is shaped by 
the idiosyncratic decisions made previously by management; in other words, by the firm’s ‘very 
nature’. Thus, ETP displays the tension between the search for generalities and the need to pay 
attention to the specifics (i.e., context and history) in any ‘useful’ economics. 
Kor and colleagues go on to list various attempts to formalize ETP’s ideas, underscoring 
the mainstream’s obsession with shoehorning her thinking into a rigorous, mathematical format. 
Interplaying qualitative axiom discovery with quantitative or formal hypothesis testing is a 
legitimate academic activity, much evident in our research literature. But it was not what ETP 
was up to. Rather, she stated that “[e]ach analyst is free to choose any characteristics of firms 
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that he is interested in, to define firms in terms of those characteristics, and to proceed thereafter 
to call the construction so defined a ‘firm’” (E. T. Penrose, 2009: 9), highlighting her project’s 
relativism and subjectivism. Thus, in LGSF and especially in TTGF, she sketched a language 
generic enough to help entrepreneurs think through the connections between managerial 
experience, learning, firm growth, and the constraints to growth. 
Our contention is that the language ETP developed in TTGF is about extending and 
facilitating entrepreneurial choice. For an entrepreneur to exercise choice, there must be 
‘opportunity spaces’. ETP focused on searching for these at the ‘interstices’ between the 
economy’s existing businesses (E. T. Penrose, 2009: 194). In these spaces, managers can draw 
upon their entrepreneurial imagination. However, theorizing about entrepreneurial imagination is 
fraught, pointing to the boundaries between reasoning and whatever alternative modes of 
knowing we presume. Imagination can only be illuminated by identifying the contextual (i.e., 
social, technological, legal, economic) constraints within which the imaginer’s freedoms arise 
and might be exercised. These constraints are external and internal, and objective and subjective. 
Imagining is also shaped by the imaginer’s interests and ethics. We suggest ETP’s discussion of 
opportunities, constraints and interests provide a loose but general ‘recipe’ for entrepreneurial 
activity in a capitalist democracy (E. T. Penrose, 2009: 5). 
Since each recipe is synthesized into a ‘coherent whole’ by the entrepreneur adopting it, 
each aspect complementing every other, it does not matter how we begin to unpack it (Spender, 
2014). Rather than follow ETP’s sequence in TTGF, we economize and list her axioms as Kor 
and colleagues did. This is not simply positivistic reductionism. Rather, it is the search for a 
‘natural language’ of entrepreneurship adapted to a specific context. Ultimately every axiom 
chosen is a distinction between alternative statements that can be useful in that context. 
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1. Economies of growth versus economies of size 
2. Dynamics of open evolutionary real-world processes versus abstracted decisions about 
structure and design 
3. Nature of human heterogeneity, the unique idiography of our practices, and of the 
heterogeneity of relevant managerial capabilities  
4. Managerial capabilities that transform heterogeneous resources into the heterogeneous 
services valuable in that situation 
5. Each managerial capability’s finiteness and indivisibility 
6. The practical and mathematical impossibility of perfectly matching a finite bundle of 
resources to a finite need 
7. Managers deploy various services to meet various needs, and such practices may lead them 
to develop new capabilities  
8. An actors’ perceptions of time (and history) are learned and shape future perceptions 
9. Under-utilized resources and capabilities always press entrepreneurs towards their further 
application, so driving growth shaped by their interests, or they wither 
10. Managers’ mental capacity to create new capabilities becomes a limiting or ‘strategic’ 
constraint to growth 
11. Entrepreneur’s capabilities and choices can be extended and institutionalized into ‘a firm’ 
by decentralization and delegation 
12. The resulting division of labor is shaped and directed through ‘authoritative 
communication’ 




14. A team’s capabilities are limited by its rate of learning and its rate of adding and 
institutionalizing new members, further defining the firm’s time scales. 
15. Natura non facit saltus (nature does not make leaps, or change is continuous) 
The Invisible College 
In the previous section, we discussed the language ETP developed in LGSF and TTGF. It 
can be understood as a general ‘recipe’ for entrepreneurial activity in a capitalist democracy. In 
this section, we explore how ETP’s language connects her to the ‘invisible college’ of 
economists interested in advancing an ethically infused economics that could better serve 
society’s needs. For convenience, we label this project to create an economics of the ‘ordinary 
business of life’ the Marshall-Knight-Coase-Penrose (MKCP) project. While learning from 
predecessors such as Darwin, Smith, Spencer, and Turgot, as well as contemporaries like 
Commons, Menger, Pareto, Schmoller, Weber, and Young, the college’s project was specific: an 
economics that could serve entrepreneurs within a capitalist democracy. It presumed the private 
firms created were (a) beneficial to those impacted and (b) socially and politically legitimate. 
No investigation of a researcher’s methods can ignore questions about their purposes; 
‘why this method?’ Marshall was a complicated case. Not only a pluralist, he pursued a plurality 
of objectives, striving for both usefulness and rigor. Rather than being ambivalent about the 
possibility of a ‘science of economics’, he maintained it could never be more than part of human 
understanding (Raffaelli, 2003; Raffaelli, Becattini, & Dardi, 2006). Thus, as noted earlier, in the 
shadow of the Methodenstreit he encouraged J. N. Keynes to write The Scope and Method of 
Political Economy to demonstrate that pluralism could be a viable path in the study of economics 
(Moore, 2003). Keynes’ book became the leading British methodological text for economists in 
the early-20th century. 
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Following Marshall, FHK also had hopes for the possibility of a rigorous science of 
economics (Knight, 1924, 2006). However, he saw uncertainty and judgment as concepts that 
limited rigorous theorizing. Greatly influenced by his mentor, Allyn Young, FHK’s work 
focused on economic institutions or ‘social organizations’ (e.g., Knight, 2013). While many 
economists saw only markets and economic actors, FHK saw markets as but one of the many 
types of economic institutions history revealed arising, created for differing purposes. FHK’s 
interest in markets stemmed from the novel social and political freedoms they provided. He 
recognized markets could not be a society’s only economic institution. He also argued ‘every 
economic choice was ultimately a matter of ethics’ (Boyd, 1997; Emmett, 2009: 98; Knight, 
1922). Thus, he saw economics as the study of the alternative, politically-available economic 
institutions so as to compare their social benefits (Emmett, 2010; Knight, 2013: 5).  
FKH’s study of alternative economic institutions led him to conclude that if there was a 
rigorous science of economics, there could be no place for institutionalized knowledge or 
process. There would be no uncertainty and the analyst would be in the condition of ‘perfect 
knowledge’, the condition most neoliberal economists admit feasible. FHK suspected neither 
firms nor markets could exist under this condition. Hence, in contrast, presuming uncertainty 
characterized the ‘ordinary business of life’, FHK intuited the possibility of real firms, real 
markets, and real ‘business ethics’. Thereby he laid the groundwork for Coase’s comparison of 
markets and hierarchies. FHK and Coase saw economics, social purpose, and personal ethics as 
wrapped intimately together. 
Following J. N. Keynes’s prescription, the MKCP project’s economics would take up 
such rigorous science as could be brought to bear, given the firm’s processes are in the physical 
world, not mere abstractions of the mind. However, as the economics professions’ methods 
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changed, so did its purposes. Eventually, this user-oriented (and ethically infused) project was 
overtaken by the profession’s hunger to ape natural science’s rigorous (and non-ethical) methods 
(Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017). Note Milton Friedman’s Methodology of Positive Economics 
took off from Keynes’s book by dismissing history and art, narrowing Marshall’s pluralism into 
today’s monism (Friedman, 1953). 
What is ETP’s connection to the other members of this ‘invisible college’? She was 
clearly moving against the trend to rigor, searching for a ‘useful’ analysis, but ‘useful’ to whom: 
managers or economic theorists? Commenting in 1995, ETP was encouraged by the changes she 
saw as non-traditional ToFs became more visible in business schools, if not in economics 
departments (E. T. Penrose, 2009: 235). However, while TTGF’s connection to the resource-
based view (RBV) in strategic management is generally how ETP is remembered today, we 
suggest that ETP’s greatest contribution rests in the ‘natural language’ she developed to describe 
entrepreneurial activity. Rather than an attempt to model optimal economic behavior, TTGF 
harkens back to the work of Marshall, FHK, and Coase, providing insight into how entrepreneurs 
engage with an uncertain world in the pursuit of economic value. In line with FHK, ETP showed 
all entrepreneurial choices in a non-blackboard world are ‘under uncertainty’ and thus ethically 
burdened, impacting others’ lives. Consequently, in line with Marshall, FHK, and Coase, ETP’s 
economics was of a more open society, with better production and distribution of economic 
goods, and more personal freedom (E.T. Penrose, 1958, 2009: 235). 
The Separation 
Having connected ETP to an ‘invisible college’ including Marshall, FHK, and Coase, we 
examine her separation of services from resources, a core aspect of the MKCP project’s 
heterodoxy. Mainstream economists equate them, meaning economic activity is about moving 
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fixed resources around, sometimes combining them. Distinguishing the resources from the 
services they provide the firm creates a logical space for economic growth. The human 
imagination can act to increase value without any market (pricing) interaction. ETP was 
remarkably silent on where she got this idea. To pass over this, or to presume that she thought of 
it for herself does her no favors, insulting her intense study and scholarship.  
The subtlest aspects of TTGF lie in the issues ETP dismissed, ignored, or obscured. She 
was remarkably up front about some. First, her focus on internal (endogenous) growth alone (E. 
T. Penrose 2009: 5). Second, her narrowed institutional context (E. T. Penrose 2009: 5). Third, 
her inattention to principal-agent issues around managerial incentives (E. T. Penrose 2009: 236). 
Finally, the most serious issue was around her “alleged ‘tautological problem’” (E. T. Penrose 
2009: 6), her inattention to firms that did not grow yet seemed in no way different from those 
that did, except that they did not grow. 
More serious still were the difficulties arising from the separation (E.T. Penrose, 2009: 
25). Those of positivist disposition look in vain for a testable relationship between resources and 
services, grounded on something measurable. ETP offered no testable relationship between 
resource(s) and firm growth precisely because she separated them by the services provided by 
under-determined imagining and learning, for there can be no measure of imagining. Likewise, 
she offered no measure of management’s capability to transform the resources available into 
novel services, nor of management’s capability to generate growth. She also did not offer any 
testable theory of managerial learning that would relate experience or time to capability or firm 
growth. Perhaps, as the RBV suggests, resources were simply those ‘things’ that ‘caused’ 




The radical nature of her focus on the services provided by the firm’s resources rather 
than on resources as defined by prices separated her analysis from mainstream economics. No 
question, it spurred many to see TTGF as under-theorized (Kor et al., 2016: 1738). Those trying 
to formalize TTGF had to claim finding therein some measurable variables such as the formulae 
in Buckley and Casson (2007) or the curves in Rubin (1973), Slater (1980), or Uzawa (1969). 
However, these variables were far from the MKCP vocabulary. ETP seemingly skirted tautology 
without recognizing it was the inevitable consequence of a positivist determinism that searches 
for testable theories in historical processes (Parsons, 1968; Popper, 2002). 
Contrary to Buckley and Casson’s (2007) claim that ETP’s method was non-heterodox, 
our examination of ETP’s methods suggest they were deeply institutional and anti-positivist. Her 
empirics were likewise historical and institutional, as evidenced in her Hercules study (see E. T. 
Penrose, 1960). Note her methods differed from Chandler’s ‘compare and contrast’ study of the 
adoption of the M-form in his 50 US companies (Chandler, 1962). Chandler’s intuition was that 
all firms in all industries needed to adapt their structures as their strategies evolved, especially to 
cope with diseconomies of scale. In contrast, ETP was not searching for causal relations or the 
predictability Friedman argued was the essence of ‘scientific’ theorizing. Rather, like others 
involved in the MKCP project, she aspired to help entrepreneurs by revealing socio-economic 
tendencies that would clarify the nature and limits of their agency. Illuminating these might help 
them create arrangements that better served both their firms’ interests and society’s. 
Returning to the question of the origins of ETP’s separation of resources and services, 
there is no definitive answer. She may not have known herself, nor cared much, but the 
separation identified the boundary between the language of the market and the language of the 
firm, the place where resources might be transformed into services, and vice versa. Given the 
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transformation was key to the firm as an apparatus of ‘endogenous growth’ there are questions 
around why, when so many believe ETP was the author of the first such theory, Paul Romer 
received the ‘Economics Nobel’ in 2018. Romer’s work seemed to overlook entrepreneurs and 
firms entirely (e.g., Romer, 1990). However, Romer’s methods were formal, which might 
explain why his work was honored. Note ETP’s work was not cited in his entire oeuvre. 
One possible source of the separation was Pen’s work. A decade before meeting ETP he 
investigated how the Japanese people had increased their nation’s food supply far beyond what 
agricultural economists theorized possible. It seemed they had learned something these 
economists had not. Pen saw this learning as institutional, not as a technological breakthrough. 
Japan’s religious, legal, technological, and agricultural institutions constituted a mode of life that 
fell outside the Western agricultural theorists’ ken, a ‘weltanschauung’ to which Western 
economists were not privy (E. F. Penrose, 1929, 1934). ETP’s firm was just such a novel 
worldview, occupied and bounded by its singular language (Spender, 2014). 
Another speculation was that ETP found the separation in Marshall, where we hear 
everything about economics can be found. Raffaelli unpacked the ‘model of learning’ laid out in 
Marshall’s Ye Machine (Raffaelli, 2003: 28). At its core was an interplay of imagining and 
routinizing, a notion that re-appeared in Simon (1958) and Nelson and Winter (1982). However, 
TTGF offered no such theory of managerial or team learning. Thus, we suggest that the 
inspiration for the separation in TTGF came from elsewhere, perhaps from FHK’s work. 
There was no indication ETP studied FHK’s work carefully. Indeed, Machlup’s 
disagreements with FHK may have dissuaded her. However, the 1933 Preface to the Re-Issue of 
RUP may have seemed especially relevant. In it FHK took issue with Pigou on ‘economies of 
scale’ and wrote the relationship between efficiency and size is “one of the most serious 
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problems of theory” arguing “generally speaking the expansion of a firm … cannot be 
represented by a reversible functional relation” (Knight, 2006: xiii, xxiii). He dismissed rigorous 
models and brought management knowledge and learning to the center (Knight, 2006: xxv), 
arguing “[t]he basic economic magnitude … is service, not good” (Knight, 2006: xxvi). FHK 
looked at economics through the entrepreneur’s lens rather than through the prism of the perfect 
market. Thus, obliquely, but in support of our assertion that the separation might have been 
inspired by FHK, we offer: “I am convinced that less damage has been done to economic 
thinking by any other single error, unless it be that of labor cost, than by the notion of production 
as production of wealth; production is the rendering of service, by goods (wealth) and by 
persons” (Knight, 2006: xxvi). 
Concluding Comments 
ETP did not move with the MKCP project as it grew into New Institutional Economics 
(NIE). NIE’s most defining development was ‘transaction costs’ (TCs), generally attributed to 
Coase but already evident in FHK’s work. Note Coase mentioned ‘entrepreneur’ over 20 times in 
his 1937 paper, TCs not once. TCs bear on the question of into which services should the firm’s 
available resources be transformed and how, the study of which would have added additional 
axioms and depth to ETP’s analysis. Largely derived from Williamson’s work, the popular view 
is that firms exist when they lessen the TCs that would be incurred were the same transactions 
conducted in markets (Williamson, 2010). This view diverges far from the MKCP project. When 
TCs are non-zero but determinable, they can only be distinguished from factor costs arbitrarily 
and so can never ‘explain’ the choice of firm or market arrangements. The firm must exist before 
these costs can be incurred, known, and compared. In contrast, if TCs are not determinable but 
are matters of entrepreneurial valuation, calling for judgment rather than computation, the 
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analysis shifts from formalism into pluralism (Spender, 2018). 
The MKCP project explored how pluralist thinking might aid the entrepreneurs’ practical 
arts, illuminating their experience of the ‘ordinary business of life’. Non-zero TCs help clarify 
the conceptual distance between the RBV and ETP’s thinking. Aside from Wernerfelt’s (1984: 
171) serendipitous borrowing of ETP’s notion of the firm as a ‘broader set of resources’, there is 
little echo of ETP’s thinking in the RBV literature (Kraaijenbrink, Spender, & Groen, 2010; 
Rugman & Verbeke, 2002, 2004). There is no firm in the RBV, nor mechanisms to transform 
resources into services or profits. There is also no analysis beyond the tautology that valuable, 
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) resources earn sustainable rents (Conner, 1991; 
Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Priem, 2001; Priem & Butler, 2001). Ironically, the RBV’s tautology 
is even more vicious than ETP’s since time, evolution, learning, and history, and all questions 
about the acquisition, integration, deployment, and transformation of VRIN resources, are 
excised (Barney, 1991; Barney & Mackey, 2005). 
Non-zero TCs bear directly on ETP’s methods. Yet there was no sign her fondness for 
Marshall led her to read J. N. Keynes’ The Scope and Method of Political Economy. Her 
comments on research method in TTGF and in her 1958 Baghdad paper present rigorous and 
interpretive methods as alternatives (E. T. Penrose, 1958). Most social scientists agree, debating 
whether the methods can complement each other for fuller understanding or are categorically 
distinct implying incompatible research projects. However, in the real world TCs are never zero 
and the debate is different. Costs are as many-dimensioned as our knowledge of the world, 
calling for entrepreneurial judgment about their type and dimension. 
Keynes’s three dimensioned analysis of (a) formal theory, (b) political-economic 
research, and (c) agentic art limited the relevance of formal theorizing in precisely the way the 
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members of the MKCP project argued. In the end, institutional analysis is never determinative. 
Executive art is always required whenever TCs are positive. Such entrepreneurial capabilities are 
‘costly’, but not as factors of production and the monetary terms of much of the current NIE 
literature. They may instead be matters of emotional, psychological, or ethical burden, or matters 
of non-zero time (Spender, 2018). 
While Coase’s suggestions about entrepreneurship in “Nature of the Firm” were 
astringent and ambiguous, putting deals together is always a matter of entrepreneurial judgment, 
never simply a matter of computing measurable costs (Coase, 1937: 390). FHK’s and Coase’s 
focus on alternative social organizations considered these arrangements’ TCs pluralistically. 
Unfortunately, there is no sign that ETP ever studied FHK’s or Coase’s work closely enough to 
ponder the impact of positive TCs on her thinking. But given her fieldwork and deep familiarity 
with the executive process she would surely have found it profitable. 
In closing, ETP brought a deep political and ethical awareness to her economics. She was 
a labor activist in her youth, travelled widely, and saw revolution up front in Iraq (A. Penrose, 
2018). ETP knew economics could only be ‘useful’ if it was politically and ethically situated and 
informed, a long way from the mainstream’s blackboard. Her other intuitions were apposite, for 
she realized all business thinking would be ‘global’ long before international business became 
established in business schools (Dunning, 2003). Finally, despite being acclaimed as firm 
growth’s premier theorist she could not have anticipated the turn away from her ethically 
grounded discussion of growth in today’s environment where unicorns and GAFA firms are 
lauded as pinnacles of achievement. In such firms, growth is the end, rather than a process, 
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